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Abstract
In this paper we study a mean field model for discrete time, finite number of states,
dynamic games. These models arise in situations that involve a very large number of agents
moving from state to state according to certain optimality criteria. The mean field approach
for optimal control and differential games (continuous state and time) was introduced by Lasry
and Lions [LL06a, LL06b, LL07]. The discrete time, finite state space setting is motivated
both by its independent interest as well as by numerical analysis questions which appear in
the discretization of the problems introduced by Lasry and Lions.
Our setting is the following: we assume that there is a very large number of identical
agents which can be in a finite number of states. Because the number of agents is very
large, we assume the mean field hypothesis, that is, that the only relevant information for the
global evolution is the fraction pini of players in each state i at time n. The agents look for
minimizing a running cost, which depends on pi, plus a terminal cost V N . In contrast with
optimal control, where usually only the terminal cost V N is necessary to solve the problem,
in mean-field games both the initial distribution of agents pi0 and the terminal cost V N are
necessary to determine the solutions, that is, the distribution of players pin and value function
V n, for 0 ≤ n ≤ N . Because both initial and terminal data needs to be specified, we call this
problem the initial-terminal value problem. Existence of solutions is non-trivial. Nevertheless,
following the ideas of Lasry and Lions, we were able to establish existence and uniqueness,
both for the stationary and for the initial-terminal value problems. We discuss in some detail
a particular model, the entropy penalized problem. In the last part of the paper we prove
the main result of the paper, namely the exponential convergence to a stationary solution of
(pi0, V 0), as N →∞, for the initial-terminal value problem with (fixed) data pi−N and V N .
1 Introduction
In this paper we study a mean field model for discrete time, finite number of states, dynamic games.
These models arise in situations that involve a very large number of agents moving from state to
state according to certain optimality criteria. The mean field approach for optimal control and
differential games (continuous state and time) was introduced by Lasry and Lions [LL06a, LL06b,
LL07]. In the continuous state and time setting, mean field problems gives rise to Hamilton-
Jacobi equations coupled with transport equations. The discrete time, finite state space setting
is motivated both by its independent interest as well as by numerical analysis questions which
appear in the discretization of the problems introduced by Lasry and Lions. The discretization of
these models has been studied by I. Capuzzo-Dolcetta and Y. Achdou.
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Our setting is the following: we assume that there is a very large number of identical agents
which can be in a finite number of states. Each agent behaves individually and rationally, moving
from state to state according to certain optimality criteria. Furthermore, its decisions are based
solely on the following information, which is know by every agent, the current state, and the
fraction of agents in each state. As in non-cooperative games, there may be interactions between
the players in different states, as we will explain in more detail bellow. Because the number
of agents is very large, we assume the mean field hypothesis, that is, that only the fraction πni
of players in each state i at time n is the relevant information for the global evolution. The
mathematical justification of mean field models has been investigated extensively by Lions and
Lasry in yet to be published papers and we do not address these issues in this work.
Let d > 1 and N ≥ 1 be natural numbers, representing, respectively, the number of possible
states in which the agents can be at any given time, and the total duration of the process. Let
π0 and V N be given d-dimensional vectors. We suppose that π0 is a probability vector, the initial
probability distribution of agents among states, and that V N , the terminal cost, is an arbitrary
vector. A solution to the mean field game is a sequence of pairs of d-dimensional vectors
{(πn, V n) ; 0 ≤ n ≤ N} ,
where πn is the probability distribution of agents among states at time n and V nj is the expected
minimum total cost for an agent at state j, at time n. These pairs must satisfy certain optimality
conditions that we describe in what follows: at every time step, the agents in state i choose a
transition probability, Pij , from state i to state j. Given the transition probabilities P
n
ij at time
0 ≤ n < N , the distribution of agents at time n+ 1 is simply
πn+1j =
∑
i
πni P
n
ij .
Associated to this choice there is a transition cost cij(π, P ). In the special case in which cij only
depends on π and on the ith line of P we use the simplified notation cij(π, Pi·). This last case
arises when the choices of players in states j 6= i do not influence the transition cost to an agent
in state i. Let ei(π, P, V ) be the average cost that agents which are in state i incur when matrix
P is chosen, given the current distribution π and the cost vector V at the subsequent instant. We
assume that
ei(π, P, V ) =
∑
j
cij(π, P )Pij + VjPij .
Define the probability simplex S = {(q1, ..., qd) ; qj ≥ 0 ∀j,
∑d
j=1 qj = 1}. The set of d × d
stochastic matrices is identified with Sd. Given a stochastic matrix P ∈ Sd and a probability
vector q ∈ S, we define P(P, q, i) to be the d × d stochastic matrix obtained from P by replacing
the i-th row by q, and leaving all others unchanged.
Definition 1. Fix a probability vector π ∈ S and a cost vector V ∈ Rd. A stochastic matrix
P ∈ Sd is a Nash minimizer of e(π, ·, V ) if for each i ∈ {1, ..., d} and any q ∈ S
ei(π, P, V ) ≤ ei(π,P(P, q, i), V ).
Definition 2. Suppose that for each π ∈ S and V ∈ Rd there exists a Nash minimizer P ∈ Sd of
e(π, ·, V ). Let N ≥ 1, π0 ∈ S (the initial distribution of states), and V N ∈ Rd (the terminal cost).
A sequence of pairs of d-dimensional vectors
{(πn, V n) ; 0 ≤ n ≤ N}
is a solution of the mean field game if for every 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1

V ni =
∑
j cij(π
n, Pn)Pnij + V
n+1
j P
n
ij
πn+1j =
∑
i π
n
i P
n
ij ,
(1)
2
for some Nash minimizer Pn ∈ Sd of e(πn, ·, V n+1).
Until the end of this section we will assume that for all (π, V ) ∈ S× Rd there exists a unique
Nash minimizer P¯ of e(π, P, V ). Conditions which guarantee the uniqueness of a Nash minimizer
will be studied in §3.2. Under the uniqueness of a Nash minimizer for e, we can define the
(backwards) evolution operator for the value function
Gπ(V ) = e(π, P¯ , V ), (2)
as well as the (forward) evolution operator for π
KV (π) = πP¯ . (3)
Since the operator Gπ commutes with addition with constants, it can be regarded as a map from
R
d/R to Rd/R. Here Rd/R is the set of equivalence classes of vectors in Rd whose components
differ by the same constant. In Rd/R we define the norm
‖ψ‖# := inf
λ∈R
‖ψ + λ‖, (4)
In this paper we will regard Gπ, depending on what is convenient, as both a map in R
d as well as
a map in Rd/R.
We have the compact equivalent form for (1)

V n = Gπn(V
n+1)
πn+1 = KV n+1(π
n).
(5)
In this paper we will consider solutions to (5) which satisfy initial-terminal value conditions, π0
(or π−N ) and V N , as well as stationary solutions, that we discuss in what follows.
Definition 3. A pair of vectors (π¯, V¯ ) is a stationary solution to the mean field game if there
exists a constant λ¯, called critical value, such that

V¯ = Gπ¯(V¯ ) + λ¯
π¯ = KV¯ (π¯).
(6)
We should remark that the first equation in (6) can be written in Rd/R as Gπ(V¯ ) = V¯ .
Therefore, solutions to (6) can be regarded as fixed points of (Gπ ,KV ) in R
d/R× S.
The structure of the paper is as follows: we first start, in §2 by listing our main assumptions,
as well as explaining where they are needed in the paper. In §3 we address the issue of existence,
theorem 1, and uniqueness, theorem 2, of Nash-minimizing transition matrices. Some general
properties of the operator G are studied in §4. In §5 we establish several results concerning the
existence, theorem 3, and uniqueness, propositions 7, 8 and theorem 4, of stationary solutions to
mean field games. The initial-terminal value problem is studied in §6. We show also existence,
theorem 5, and uniqueness, theorem 6, of solutions for this problem. Both in the stationary and
initial-terminal value problem the uniqueness proofs use a version of the mononicity argument
of Lasry and Lions in [LL06a, LL06b, LL07]. In the last section we address the convergence to
equilibrium and establish one of the main results of the paper, theorem 7, which states that, as
we take the initial and terminal conditions far appart (n = ±N), the solutions at n = 0 converge
exponentially to a stationary solution. Throughout the paper we discuss with detail the entropy
penalized problem For this model we give an independent proof of existence of stationary solutions,
proposition 9 and study the large entropy limit, proposition 10. Another important example is the
optimal stationary solutions, discussed in §5.7 which give a variational interpretation of a solution
of certain mean field games in terms of non-linear programming problems, proposition 11.
3
2 Main Assumptions
In this section, for the convenience of the reader, we list the main assumptions that will be needed
in the text. We list here only the assumptions that will be used in the main results or the ones
which are repeatedly used in the text. A few other assumptions will be introduced later in the
text and will only be used ”locally” in the section they are stated.
The first two assumptions will be used in theorem 1, §3.1, to establish existence of a Nash
minimizer of e.
Assumption 1. For each π ∈ S, V ∈ Rd, P ∈ Sd, and each index 1 ≤ i ≤ d, the mapping
q 7→ ei(π,P(P, q, i), V ), defined for q ∈ S, and taking values on R, is convex.
Assumption 2. The map P 7→ ei(π, P, V ) is continuous for all i.
Concerning the uniqueness of Nash minimizers, addressed in §3.2, we need the following defi-
nition (see [HK] for the motivation of this assumption):
Definition 4. A function g : Rd×d → Rd×d is diagonally convex if for all P 1, P 2 ∈ Rd, P 1 6= P 2,
we have ∑
ij
(P 1ij − P
2
ij)(gij(P
1)− gij(P
2)) > 0.
With this definition we can state the next assumption:
Assumption 3. Let
gij(P ) =
∂ei(π, P, V )
∂Pij
.
Then g is diagonally convex.
Since diagonal convexity may not be the unique way to ensure uniqueness of Nash minimizers,
it is convenient to add uniqueness as an assumption, which obviously holds under assumptions
1-3, but which can also hold under other alternative hypothesis.
Assumption 4. For each (π, V ) there exists a unique Nash minimizer P (π, V ) of e(π, ·, V ).
The uniqueness of P (π, V ) makes the operators KV and Gπ well defined. Therefore, from §5
on we will always suppose that assumption 4 holds, even without explicit mention.
To establish continuity of P (π, V ), §3.3, proposition 1, we need:
Assumption 5. For each index 1 ≤ i ≤ d, ei : S× S
d × Rd → R is a continuous function.
Denote by ρi,i′ (P ) the matrix we obtain from P by replacing its i
′-th row by its i-th row, and
leaving all other rows (including the i-th) unchanged.
Assumption 6. There exists C > 0 such that for all i and i′, and any π ∈ S, P ∈ Sd∑
j
| cij(π, P )− ci′j(π, ρi,i′ (P ))|Pij ≤ C. (7)
Note that the previous assumption holds if cij is bounded, for instance.
Some of the results of the paper only hold for transition costs which have a special dependence
on P . The next assumption will be required frequently:
Assumption 7. The cost cij(π, Pi·) depends on π and, for each i, only on the i-th line of P.
To establish uniqueness of solutions (§5.4, theorem 7, §6.2, theorem 6), as well as to obtain ex-
ponential convergence to stationary solutions (§7, theorem 7) it is convenient to have the following
assumption on the operator G:
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Assumption 8. There exists a constant γ > 0 such that
π˜ · (Gπ˜(V )− Gπ(V )) + π · (Gπ(V˜ )− Gπ˜(V˜ )) ≥ γ‖π − π˜‖
2,
for any V, V˜ ∈ Rd and all π, π˜ ∈ S.
An example where this last hypothesis is satisfied is the following:
cij(π, Pi·) = Wi(π) + c˜ij(Pi·), (8)
where W is a monotone function, that is,
(π − π˜) · (W (π)−W (π˜)) ≥ γ‖π − π˜‖2, (9)
where γ is a positive constant. For instance, the gradient of a convex function is a monotone
function. In this case we have
Gπ(V )(i) = Wi(π) + min
Pij
∑
j
(c˜ij(Pi·) + Vj)Pij .
The special structure in (8) arises naturally in certain problems, see §5.7.
To establish the uniqueness of the critical value we need the following assumption:
Assumption 9. For any π ∈ S, the operator V 7→ Gπ(V ) satisfies the following property: for all
V 1, V 2 and any i ∈ argmax(V 1 − V 2) we have
Gπ(V
1)i − V
1
i ≤ Gπ(V
2)i − V
2
i ,
with the opposite inequality if i ∈ argmin(V 1 − V 2).
As it will be proved in §4.1, proposition 3, assumption 7 implies assumption 9. However, we
leave it explicit to make easier the understanding of what follows.
The following strict concavity of G is important to establish uniqueness of stationary solutions
and the exponential convergence to equilibrium.
Assumption 10. For all π ∈ S and all V 1, V 2 ∈ Rd we have
π · (Gπ(V
2)− Gπ(V
1)) +KV 1(π)(V
1 − V 2) ≤ −γπ‖V
1 − V 2‖2#.
This last assumption is a slightly stronger version of inequality (16), which is a consequence
of assumptions 4 and 7.
A final hypothesis allow us to establish certain bounds (lemma 2 in §7.1) which are useful in
proving the exponential convergence to equilibrium:
Assumption 11. There exists K > 0 such that for all π, π˜ ∈ S, and for any matrix P ∈ Sd
| cij(π, P )− cij(π˜, P )| ≤ K. (10)
Note that the previous assumption holds if cij is bounded, for instance.
3 The Transition Matrix
In this section we discuss the problem of existence, uniqueness and continuity of the Nash equilib-
rium transition matrix P. As we will see, this problem is non-trivial and requires, in the general
case, the use of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, see theorem 1 in §3.1. Once existence is estab-
lished, uniqueness can be proven for a general class of cost functionals, theorem 2 in §3.2. We
finish this section with the discussion of a special case: the entropy penalized model, §3.4.
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3.1 Existence in the general case
Theorem 1. Suppose that assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, for any pair of vectors π and V there
exists a Nash minimizer P of e(π, ·, V ).
Proof. Given a stochastic matrix P , define Fi(P ) to be the set of vectors in S given by
Fi(P ) = argminq∈S ei(π,P(P, q, i), V ).
The set Fi(P ) is non-empty and convex. Define F (P ) = F1(P ) × F2(P ) × ... × Fd(P ), where
we identify the cartesian product with the the set of all stochastic matrices where the i-th row
belongs to Fi(P ). Clearly, F (P ) is convex for all P . Furthermore, as we argue next, the graph
{(P ;F (P ));P ∈ Sd} is closed. Indeed, suppose that Pn → P 0 and take Qn ∈ F (Pn), if Qn → Q0
we want to show that Q0 ∈ F (P 0). Fix i and call qni the i-th coordinate of Q
n, then by hypothesis
ei(π,P(P
n, qni , i), V ) ≤ ei(π,P(P
n, q′, i), V ) for all q′ ∈ S. As qni → q
0
i and P
n → P 0 we have
that P(Pn, qni , i) → P(P
0, q0i , i) then we get that ei(π,P(P
0, q0i , i), V ) ≤ ei(π,P(P
0, q′, i), V ) for
all q′ ∈ S.
Then, because for each P , F (P ) is a convex set and the graph (P, F (P )) is closed, we can
apply Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, which implies the existence of a matrix P that belongs to
F (P ). Thus P is a Nash minimizer of e(π, ·, V ).
3.2 Uniqueness for diagonally convex costs
As shown in the previous section, if assumptions 1 and 2 hold, for each π and V there exists a
transition matrix P which is a Nash minimizer of e(π, ·, V ). In general, such minimizer may fail
to be unique. Under the diagonally convex assumption 3 we will show uniqueness.
Theorem 2. Suppose assumptions 1-3 hold. Then there exists a unique transition matrix P which
is a Nash minimizer of e(π, ·, V ).
Proof. Note that if P is any Nash minimizer of e(π, ·, V ), its i-th line solves the constrained
optimization problem
min
q
ei(π,P(P, q, i), V ) ,
qi ≥ 0 ,∑
i
qi = 1 .
Thus, if P 1 and P 2 are two Nash minimizers, they satisfy the KKT conditions [Ped04]
∂ei(π, P
k, V )
∂Pij
− νki − θ
k
ij = 0, k = 1, 2.
∑
j
Pij − 1 = 0 ,
and θijPij = 0 ,
where νi is the Lagrange multiplier associated with
∑
j Pij = 1 and θij ≥ 0 corresponds to the
constraint Pij ≥ 0. From the first of the three equations above we conclude that∑
ij
(P 1ij − P
2
ij)(gij(P
1)− gij(P
2)− ν1i + ν
2
i − θ
1
ij + θ
2
ij) = 0.
Therefore, using the diagonally convex property, we have∑
ij
(P 1ij − P
2
ij)(−ν
1
i + ν
2
i − θ
1
ij + θ
2
ij) < 0,
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which implies, when we use θkijP
k
ij = 0, that∑
ij
(
−P 1ijν
1
i − P
2
ijν
2
i + P
1
ijν
2
i + P
2
ijν
1
i + P
1
ijθ
2
ij + P
2
ijθ
1
ij
)
< 0.
Now we can use that ∑
j
P kijν
l
i = ν
l
i , ∀ 1 ≤ l, k ≤ 2 ,
to get ∑
ij
(
P 1ijθ
2
ij + P
2
ijθ
1
ij
)
< 0.
Since P 1ijθ
2
ij , P
2
ijθ
1
ij ≥ 0, we obtain a contradiction.
3.3 Uniqueness and continuity
Suppose assumption 4 holds. Consider the map which associates to each pair (π, V ) its unique
optimizing transition matrix P (π, v). Is it natural to ask whether this map is a continuous function.
This is addressed in the next proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose assumptions 4-5 hold. Then P (π, V ) is a continuous function of π and
V .
Proof. Consider sequences πn → π and Vn → V . The corresponding sequence of Nash minimizers
Pn = P (πn, Vn) converges to a Nash minimizer, by the continuity of e, assumption 5. Therefore,
by the uniqueness hypothesis (assumption 4) P (πn, Vn)→ P (π, V ).
3.4 The entropy penalized model
Now we consider a special example, the entropy penalized model. We fix a positive constant ǫ,
and consider assume that cij(π, Pi·) = c˜ij(π) + ǫ ln(Pij), where c˜ij is a continuous function of π.
For simplicity we will drop the ∼. We have
ei(π, P, V ) =
∑
j
Pij (cij(π) + ǫ lnPij + Vj) . (11)
The term ǫPij lnPij , with ǫ > 0, is related to entropy and forces the agents to diversify their
transition choices by enforcing a penalty if they do not do so.
It is easy to prove that there exists a unique Nash minimizing transition matrix given by
Pij(π, V ) =
e−
cij(π)+Vj
ǫ∑
k e
−
cik(π)+Vk
ǫ
. (12)
Also, this transition matrix is a continuous function of π and V .
Now we present a useful formula for the second derivatives of Gπ(V )i:
∂2Gπ(V )i
∂Vk∂Vl
=
pkpl − pkδkl
ǫ
≡ Jkl,
where
pk =
e−
cik(π)+Vk
ǫ∑
m e
−
cim(π)+Vm
ǫ
. (13)
Because
∑
k Jkl = 0, the matrix Jkl has a zero eigenvalue, which is a reflection of the fact that
Gπ commutes with addition of constants. As we show in the next proposition this eigenvalue is
simple.
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Proposition 2. Suppose 0 < pk < 1,
∑
k pk = 1 and let
Jkl =
pkpl − pkδkl
ǫ
.
Then 0 has simple multiplicity.
Proof. Observe that
J =
1
ǫ
D(Q− I),
where
D = diag{p1, . . . , pn}
and
Qkl = pl
If 0 is not a simple eigenvalue, it would mean that there exists w and v which are linearly in-
dependent eigenvectors corresponding to this eingenvalue. But then v and w are eigenvectors of
Q corresponding to the eigenvalue 1. But this contradicts Perron-Frobenius theorem because the
eigenvalue 1 is a simple eigenvalue of Q.
4 Properties of G
In this section we discuss the main properties of the operator G. In §4.1 we show that assumption
9 is a consequence of assumptions 4 and 7, and in §4.2 we study concavity properties of G. A-
priori bounds, essencial to establishing existence of stationary solutions are considered in §4.3 and,
finally, in §4.4 we prove strict concavity of G for the entropy penalized model with two states.
4.1 Assumption 9
Proposition 3. Suppose assumptions 4 and 7 hold. Then assumption 9 holds.
Proof. Let V k ∈ Rd, k = 1, 2. Let i ∈ argmaxV 1 − V 2. By adding a constant, we may assume
that V 1i = V
2
i , and so because G commutes with the addition of constants, it suffices to check that
Gπ(V
1)i ≤ Gπ(V
2)i.
Because i is a maximizer of V 1j − V
2
j , for all j we have V
1
j − V
2
j ≤ 0, that is V
1
j ≤ V
2
j . Let P
2
ij be
such that
Gπ(V
2)i =
∑
j
cij(π, P
2
i·)P
2
ij + V
2
k P
2
ij .
Then
Gπ(V
1)i ≤
∑
j
cij(π, P
2
i·)P
2
ij + V
1
j P
2
ij ≤
∑
j
cij(π, P
2
i·)P
2
ij + V
2
j P
2
ij = Gπ(V
2)i.
Arguing similarly we obtain the opposite inequality when i ∈ argminV 1 − V 2.
4.2 Concavity
If assumption 7 holds, for each fixed index i the mapping
V 7→ Gπ(V )i
is concave since
Gπ(V )i = min
Pi·∈S
∑
j
cij(π, Pi·)Pij + VjPij , (14)
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is a pointwise minimum of linear functions of V . Furthermore, since π ≥ 0,
V 7→ π · Gπ(V )
is also concave.
Suppose that P (π, V ), the transition matrix that realizes the minimum in (14), is differentiable
with respect to V . We will use the notation P π,V = P (π, V ). Then
∂Gπ(V )i
∂Vj
= P π,Vij .
In general, however, P π,V is may not be differentiable. Nevertheless, we have the following rigorous
statement:
Proposition 4. Suppose assumptions 4 and 7 hold. Then
(a) If V 1 and V 2 are any two given vectors, we have
Gπ(V
2)i ≤ Gπ(V
1)i +
∑
j
PV
1,π
ij (V
2 − V 1)j . (15)
(b) If V 2 ≥ V 1, then
0 ≤ Gπ(V
2)i − Gπ(V
1)i ≤
∑
j
PV
1,π
ij (V
2 − V 1)j .
Proof. (a) Observe that
Gπ(V
2)i ≤
∑
j
cij(π, P
V 1,π
i· )P
V 1,π
ij + V
2
j P
V 1,π
ij = Gπ(V
1)i +
∑
j
PV
1,π
ij (V
2 − V 1)j .
(b) We just need to prove the first inequality. For this, note that
Gπ(V
2)i =
∑
j
PV
2,π
ij (V
2
j + cij(π, P
V2,π
i· ))
≥
∑
j
PV
2,π
ij (V
1
j + cij(π, P
V2,π
i· )) ≥ Gπ(V
1)i.
Note that, by multiplying (15) by πi and adding, we obtain
π ·
(
Gπ(V
2)− Gπ(V
1)
)
− (V 2 − V 1) · KV 1(π) ≤ 0. (16)
Since G commutes with the addition of constants it is not possible to establish a strict concavity
estimate like
π · (Gπ(V
2)− Gπ(V
1)) + (V 1 − V 2) · KV 1(π) ≤ −γπ‖V
1 − V 2‖2
However, in certain cases it is possible to obtain the following strict concavity estimate:
π · (Gπ(V
2)− Gπ(V
1)) + (V 1 − V 2) · KV 1(π) ≤ −γπ‖V
1 − V 2‖2#.
In §4.4 we will give an explicit example.
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4.3 A-priori bounds
In the next proposition we give some a-priori bounds which are essencial to establishing the
existence of fixed points (theorem 3).
Proposition 5. Suppose assumption 6 holds. Then for any (π, V ) ∈ S × Rd and all indices i, i′
we have
|Gπ(V )i − Gπ(V )i′ | ≤ C. (17)
Proof. Fix π and V let (Gπ,KV ) be as in (2) and (3). Let P be the optimal transition matrix such
that
Gπ(V )i =
∑
j
cij(π, P )Pij + VjPij .
Since replacing the i′-th line by the i-th line in P yields a sub-optimal choice, we have
Gπ(V )i′ ≤
∑
j
ci′j(π, ρi,i′(P ))Pij + VjPij .
Hence
Gπ(V )i′ − Gπ(V )i ≤
∑
j
[−cij(π, P ) + ci′j(π, ρi,i′ (P ))]Pij .
If we exchange the role of i and i′ we have the desired estimate.
4.4 Strict concavity for the entropy penalized model
To show that the entropy penalized model satisfies the strict concavity property of assumption
10, it suffices to show that the restriction of the linear form given by the matrix D2V 2Gπ(V )i to
the space of vectors X ∈ Rd with
∑
kXk = 0 is uniformly definite positive for each i. This
holds because of proposition 2, which states that the eigenvalue 0 is simple, and the corresponding
eigenvector is Y = (1, . . . , 1). The uniformity follows from the a-priori bounds in the previous
section, which allow us to assume that ‖V ‖# is bounded. In fact (uniform) strict concavity only
holds for bounded ‖V ‖#. However, for the purposes of this paper this is enough because of the
a-priori bounds in §4.3. Thus if cij is bounded and ‖V ‖# is bounded we have 0 < pk < 1, and so
assumption 10 holds.
5 Stationary Solutions
In this section we study stationary solutions to mean field games. After the characterization of the
critical value, in §5.1, as the average cost for the population of agents, we address the question of
uniqueness of the critical value λ¯ for which (6) admits a solution. In §5.2 we give an example where
λ¯ is non-unique. However, after addressing the issue of existence of stationary solutions (in §5.3),
we revisit the uniqueness problem in §5.4 giving conditions which imply uniqueness λ¯, π¯ and V¯ .
These conditions are variations of the monotonicity conditions in [LL06a]. The entropy penalized
model is revisited in §5.5, and the large entropy limit is considered in §5.6, where we establish
uniqueness of stationary solution (proposition 10). This uniqueness proof uses a strong contraction
argument and is thus suitable for the numerical approximation of large entropy penalized mean
field games. We end this section, in §5.7, with a discussion of optimal stationary solutions, where
certain variational problems give rise to mean field games (see [LL07], §2.6, for related problems).
5.1 Representation of the critical value
We will now give a representation formula for the critical value as the average transition cost.
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Proposition 6. Suppose assumption 4 holds. Let (π¯, V¯ ) be a stationary solution to (6), and λ¯
the corresponding critical value. Let P¯ be the optimal transition matrix. Then
λ¯ =
∑
ij
πicij(π¯, P¯ )P¯ij .
Proof. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ d,
λ¯ =
∑
j
cij(π¯, P¯ )P¯ij −

V¯i −∑
j
P¯ij V¯j

 . (18)
Note that
∑
j cij(π¯, P¯ )P¯ij can be seen as the expected cost of transition agents that are in state
i will have when moving to other states. If we multiply (18) by π¯i and add, for 1 ≤ i ≤ d, we get
λ¯ =
∑
i,j
cij(π¯, P¯ )π¯iP¯ij −
∑
i,j
(
V¯i − V¯j
)
π¯iP¯ij .
Let µπ¯P¯ denote the probability measure on the set {1, 2, ..., d}2 given by µπ¯P¯ij = πiP¯ij . Since
π¯ = π¯P¯ , we have ∑
i
µπ¯P¯ij =
∑
i
µπ¯P¯ji = πj .
Therefore ∑
i,j
(
V¯i − V¯j
)
π¯iP¯ij =
∑
i,j
(
V¯i − V¯j
)
µπ¯P¯ij = 0.
So
λ¯ =
∑
cij(π¯, P¯ )µ¯
π¯P¯
ij .
5.2 Non-uniqueness of the critical value
In this section we show that the critical value may not be unique. Consider the following example:
cij(π) given by
c12 = c21 = 100,
and
c11(π
θ) = c22(π
θ) = θ.
where πθ = (θ, 1− θ), for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Then V θ = (0, 0), λθ = θ, πθ and
P θ =
[
1 0
0 1
]
is a stationary solution.
5.3 Existence of stationary solutions
Theorem 3. Suppose that assumptions 4-5 hold. Assume further that there exists C such that for
any (π, V ) ∈ S× Rd and all indices i, i′ we have (17). Then there exists a pair of vectors (π¯, V¯ ),
a constant λ¯ and a transition matrix P¯ such that for all i,
Gπ¯(V¯ )i =
∑
j
cij(π¯, P¯ )P¯ij + V¯jP¯ij = V¯i + λ¯,
and π¯ = π¯P¯ .
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Note that (17) will hold, by proposition 5, if we assume additionally assumption 6.
Proof. Since 4-5 hold, by proposition 1, the optimal transition matrix P (π, V ) is a continuous
function. Therefore the operator Gπ(·) : R
d/R → Rd/R is continuous. Furthermore, by estimate
(17), ‖Gπ(V )‖# is uniformly bounded for any V ∈ R
d.
Consider the mapping (Gπ(V ),KV (π)) : (R
d/R)× S → (Rd/R)× S. By Brouwer’s fixed point
theorem this mapping has a fixed point, which is a stationary solution since{
Gπ¯(V¯ ) = λ¯+ V¯
KV¯ (π¯) = π¯.
5.4 Uniqueness of stationary solutions
Now we address the problem of uniqueness of stationary solutions. The results in this section use
the monotonicity methods introduced in [LL06a, LL06b, LL07] - in this discrete setting, different
versions of the hypothesis will yield several uniqueness results. Under assumption 8 we will prove,
in proposition 7, the uniqueness of stationary distribution π. The uniqueness of critical value is
established in proposition 8, using assumption 9, and finally under assumption 10 we obtain the
uniqueness of π, V and λ in theorem 4.
Proposition 7. Suppose assumptions 4, 7, and 8 hold. Let (πk, V k) , k = 1, 2, be stationary
solutions:
KV k(π
k) = πk, Gπk(V
k) = λk + V k
where λk are constants. Then π1 = π2.
Proof. From the hypothesis we have
0 =(V 1 − V 2) · (KV 1(π
1)− π1 −KV2(π
2) + π2)+
+ (π1 − π2)((Gπ2(V
2)− V 2)− (Gπ1(V
1)− V 1)) + (λ1 − λ2)
∑
i
(π1i − π
2
i ).
Note that the last term vanishes since
∑
i(π
1
i − π
2
i ) = 0. Rewriting we have
0 =π1 · (Gπ1(V
2)− Gπ1(V
1)) + (V 1 − V 2) · KV 1(π
1)+
+ π2 · (Gπ2(V
1)− Gπ2(V
2)) + (V 2 − V 1) · KV 2(π
2)+
+ π1 · (Gπ2(V
2)− Gπ1(V
2)) + π2 · (Gπ1(V
1)− Gπ2(V
1)).
By proposition 4 and (16), the first term above satisfies
π1 · (Gπ1(V
2)− Gπ1(V
1)) + (V 1 − V 2) · KV 1(π
1) ≤ 0,
and similarly for the second term.
To analize the third term, observe that, by assumption 8, we have
π1 · (Gπ2(V
2)− Gπ1(V
2)) + π2 · (Gπ1(V
1)− Gπ2(V
1)) ≤ −γ‖π1 − π2‖2.
Therefore, the estimates above imply γ‖π1 − π2‖2 ≤ 0.
Now we establish the uniqueness of the critical value:
Proposition 8. Suppose assumptions 4, 7 and 9 hold. Let π ∈ S, λk ∈ R and V k ∈ Rd, k = 1, 2
be solutions of
Gπ(V
k) = λk + V k.
Then λ1 = λ2.
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Proof. Choose i ∈ argmaxV 1 − V 2. Then
λ1 = Gπ(V
1)i − V
1
i ≤ Gπ(V
2)i − V
2
i = λ
2.
By choosing i ∈ argminV 1−V 2 we obtain the opposite inequality, which then implies λ1 = λ2.
Therefore, under assumptions 8 and 9, we have both uniqueness of the stationary distribution
π and critical value λ. We now address the uniqueness of the stationary value function V .
Theorem 4. Suppose assumptions 4, 7, 8 and 10 hold. Let (πk, V k), k = 1, 2, be stationary
solutions:
KV k(π
k) = πk, Gπk(V
k) = λk + V k
where λk are constants. Then
(a) π1 = π2,
(b) V 2 = V 1 + k, where k is a constant vector,
(c) λ1 = λ2.
Proof. If we follow the proof of Proposition 7, we can use assumption 10 to get
0 = −γ1‖V
1 − V 2‖2# − γ2‖V
1 − V 2‖2# − γ‖π
1 − π2‖2 .
This implies items (a) and (b). To get item (c), we observe that
V 2 + λ2 = Gπ(V
2) = Gπ(V
1 + k) = Gπ(V
1) + k = V 1 + λ1 + k = V 2 + λ1 ,
where π = π1 = π2, in the first and fourth equalities we used Gπ(V
k) = V k+λk , in the second and
fifth we used item (b), and in the third we used the fact that Gπ commutes with constants.
5.5 Entropy penalized stationary solutions
Now we consider the entropy penalized model We will present a simple proof of existence of
solutions that relies on the special structure of the problem. A simple computation yields
Gπ(V )i = −ǫ ln
[∑
k
e−
cik(π)+Vk
ǫ
]
.
We will suppose further:
Assumption 12. The function cij(π) is continuous.
Proposition 9. Suppose assumption 12 holds. Consider the entropy penalized model (11). Then
there exists a pair of vectors (π¯, V¯ ) ∈ S× Rd, a constant λ¯ ∈ R such that
Gπ¯(V¯ ) = λ¯+ V¯
and π¯ = π¯P¯ = KV¯ (π¯).
Proof. Define the strictly positive linear operator that associates to each vector ψ ∈ Rd the vector
Lπ(ψ)i =
∑
k
e−
cik(π)
ǫ ψk.
Let e−
λπ
ǫ be the largest eigenvalue of the operator Lπ(ψ) and ψ
π the unique normalized eigenvector
associated to e−
λπ
ǫ , i.e.,
Lπ(ψ
π) = e−
λπ
ǫ ψπ .
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By Perron-Frobenius Theorem, ψπ is a strictly positive vector which is a continuous function of
π. We can define V π as ψπk = e
−
V π
k
ǫ . Let E [φ]j = e
−
φj
ǫ be the exponential transformation. These
operators are related by
Lπ ◦ E = E ◦ Gπ .
Hence
Gπ(Vπ) = Vπ + λπ . (19)
Define a new probability vector
K(π)j =
∑
i
πiPij(π, V ) =
∑
i
πi
e−
cij (π)+V
π
j
ǫ∑
k e
−
cik(π)+V
π
k
ǫ
Thus we have defined a operator K : S→ S which is continuous. By Brower’s fixed point theorem,
K has a fixed point π¯. Define V¯ π¯ and λ¯π¯ as above, and P¯ij =
e
−
cij(π¯)+V¯
π¯
j
ǫ
P
k
e
−
cik(π¯)+V¯
π¯
k
ǫ
, then (19) holds.
5.6 Stationary Solutions with large entropy
The construction of fixed points for the entropy penalized model in the last section depends on
Brower’s fixed point theorem. In the case of large entropy we can use a contraction argument to
establish the existence of a stationary solution. Before proving and stating this result we need an
elementary lemma
Lemma 1. Let T : Rn × Rn → Rn × Rn be a C1 mapping. Suppose
DT =
[
E1 M
E2 E3
]
.
where Ek, M are n × n matrices. If ‖M‖ is bounded and ‖Ek‖ is sufficiently small then T
2 is a
strong contraction in Sd × Rd/R.
Proof. It suffices to observe that
D(T 2)(x) = DT (T (x)x)DT (x)
can be written as
D(T 2) =
[
E˜1 M˜
E˜2 E˜3
] [
E1 M
E2 E3
]
=
[
E˜1E1 + M˜E2 E˜1M + M˜E3
E˜2E1 + E˜3E2 E˜2M + E˜3E3
]
,
and therefore ‖D(T 2)‖ < 1.
To establish the main result in this section we need to replace assumption 12 by
Assumption 13. The function cij(π) is a C
1 function.
Proposition 10. Suppose assumption 13 holds. Then, for large ǫ, there is a unique stationary
solution. Additionally, let T (π, V ) = (KV,ǫ(π),Gπ(V )), then T
2 is a strong contraction.
Proof. From proposition 5 we have ‖Gπ(V )‖# is uniformly bounded. Therefore it suffices to show
that the operator (K,G) is a strong contraction for V in a compact set (with respect to the norm
‖ · ‖#). Also, we can replace G by
Gˆπ(V )i = Gπ(V )i −
1
d
∑
k
Gπ(V )k,
14
and KV (π) by
KˆV (π)i = KV (π)i −
1
d

∑
j
KV (π)j − 1

 .
Since any fixed point to (Gˆ, Kˆ) is a stationary solution. In this way ‖Gπ(V )‖# = ‖Gˆπ(V )‖, and for
any π (not necessarily a probability measure), KˆV (π) is a probability measure, and agrees with
KV (π) if π is a probability measure.
We will show that, for ǫ sufficiently large, the pair (Gˆ, Kˆ) satisfies the hypothesis of lemma 1.
To do so, we first compute the matrix [
∂G
∂V
∂G
∂π
∂K
∂V
∂K
∂π
]
.
We will show that, when ǫ→∞, this matrix converges to[
[1/d] [ 1
d
∑
k
∂cik
∂πj
]
[0] [1/d]
]
,
where we denote by [a] the d× d matrix whose entries are all identical to a.
Since Gπ,ǫ(V )i = −ǫ ln
(∑
k e
−
cik(π)+Vk
ǫ
)
, we have:
(
∂Gπ(V )
∂Vj
)
i
=
e−
cij(π)+Vj
ǫ∑
k e
−
cik(π)+Vk
ǫ
−→ 1/d,
when ǫ→∞. We also have
(
∂Gπ(V )
∂πj
)
i
=
∑
k
∂cik(π)
∂πj
e−
cij(π)+Vj
ǫ∑
k e
−
cik(π)+Vk
ǫ
−→
1
d
∑
k
∂cik(π)
∂πj
,
when ǫ→∞.
Now we consider KV (π)i =
∑
k πkPki, where
Pki =
e−
cki(π)+Vi
ǫ∑
l e
−
ckl(π)+Vl
ǫ
.
We have
(
∂KV (π)
∂πj
)
i
= Pji +
∑
k
πk
∑
l e
−
ckl(π)+Vl
ǫ e−
cki(π)+Vi
ǫ
(
∂ckl(π)
∂πj
− ∂cki(π)
∂πj
)
ǫ
(∑
l e
−
ckl(π)+Vl
ǫ
)2
If we take ǫ→∞, the second term tends to zero while Pij →
1
d
. Thus(
∂KV¯ ,ǫ(π¯)
∂πj
)
i
−→
1
d
.
Since (
∂KV¯ ,ǫ(π¯)
∂Vj
)
i
=
∑
k
πk
∑
l e
−
ckl(π)+Vl
ǫ e−
cki(π)+Vi
ǫ (δlj − δkj)
ǫ
(∑
l e
−
ckl(π)+Vl
ǫ
)2 ,
we obtain (
∂KV¯ ,ǫ(π¯)
∂Vj
)
i
−→ 0,
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when ǫ→∞.
Finally, observe that[
∂Gˆ
∂V
∂Gˆ
∂π
∂Kˆ
∂V
∂Kˆ
∂π
]
=
[
I − [1/d] [0]
[0] I − [1/d]
] [
∂G
∂V
∂G
∂π
∂K
∂V
∂K
∂π
]
.
This shows that, in the limit ǫ→∞, we have[
∂Gˆ
∂V
∂Gˆ
∂π
∂Kˆ
∂V
∂Kˆ
∂π
]
→
[
[0] M
[0] [0]
]
,
where
M = (I − [1/d])[
1
d
∑
k
∂cik
∂πj
].
Thus, for ǫ large enough lemma 1 yields the strong contraction property of T 2.
5.7 Optimal Stationary Solutions
Given a probability measure ηij , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d, define π
η
i =
∑
j ηij and let P
η
ij be a stochastic
matrix such that ηij = π
η
i P
η
ij . If π
η never vanishes then P η is uniquely defined by P ηij =
ηij
π
η
i
. A
probability measure ηij is stationary if ∑
j
ηij =
∑
j
ηji. (20)
For our purposes, in this section it is convenient to consider the following two auxiliary assump-
tions:
Assumption 14. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ d the mapping Pi· 7→
∑
j cij(Pi·)Pij is convex.
and
Assumption 15. The mapping η 7→
∑
i,j π
ηcij(P
η
i· )P
η
ij is strictly convex.
Consider a C1 convex function function f : Rd → R. Consider the problem
min
η
∑
ij
πηi cij(P
η)P ηij + f(π
η), (21)
where the minimum is taken over all probability measures η satisfying (20).
Proposition 11. Let η > 0 be a solution of (21). Let V η ∈ Rd be the Lagrange multiplier
associated to the constraint (20), and λη the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to
∑
ij ηij = 1.
Then (πη, V η) is a stationary solution of
V η + λη = Gπη(V
η),
where
Gπ(V )i =
∂f
∂πi
(π) + min
Pi·
∑
j
cij(Pi·)Pij + PijVj .
Proof. Let η be as in the statement. As before write ηij = π
η
i P
η
ij . Then both π
η and P ηij are
critical points of the functional
f(π) +
∑
i
πi



∑
j
cij(P )Pij + V
η
j Pij

 − V ηi − λη

 . (22)
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Consequently, for each i, Pi· is a critical point of∑
j
cij(P )Pij + V
η
j Pij ,
which by the convexity hypothesis, assumption 14, is a minimizer. Furthermore, by differentiating
(22) with respect to πi, we obtain
Vi + λ
η = Gπη (V
η)i.
Finally, we can write (20) as
πη = KV η (π
η),
which ends the proof.
Proposition 12. Suppose assumptions 7, and 15 hold. Then there exists at most one stationary
solution with π, P > 0.
Proof. This proposition follows from the well known fact (see for instance [Ped04]) that for strictly
convex objective functions under linear constraints the KKT conditions are not only necessary
but also sufficient.
Note that if f is a strictly convex function, then the previous proposition gives us another proof
of the existence and uniqueness of the stationary solution in the case cij(π, P ) = c˜ij(Pi·) +W (π),
with W (π) = ∂f
∂πi
(π).
6 Solutions to the Mean Field Game initial-terminal value
problem
In this section we prove the existence (§6.1) and uniqueness (§6.2) of solutions to the initial-
terminal value problem.
6.1 Existence of Solutions
Theorem 5. Suppose assumptions 4 and 5 hold. Then for any initial probability vector π˜ ∈ S
and terminal cost V˜ there exists a solution
{(πn, V n) ; 0 ≤ n ≤ N}
to the initial-terminal value problem for the mean field game with π0 = π˜ and V N = V˜ .
Proof. Suppose we are given a sequence πn,0 ∈ SN+1 of probability vectors, with π0,0 = π˜. Define,
for 0 ≤ n ≤ N
V n,0 = Gπn,0(V
n+1,0),
with V N,0 = V˜ . Then let
πn+1,1 = KV n,0(π
n,1),
with π0,1 = π˜. This procedure defines a continuous mapping from SN+1 into itself that associates
to the sequence πn,0 the new sequence of probability vectors πn,1. Therefore, by Brower’s fixed
point theorem, it has a fixed point, which corresponds to a solution to the problem.
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6.2 Uniqueness
As for stationary solution we adapt Lasry and Lions monotonicity arguments to obtain uniqueness
of solutions.
Theorem 6. Suppose assumptions 4, 7 and 8 hold. Let {(πn, V n) ; 0 ≤ n ≤ N} and {(π˜n, V˜ n) ; 0 ≤
n ≤ N} be solutions of the the mean field game with π0 = π˜0 and V N = V˜ N . Then πn = π˜n, and
V n = V˜ n, for all 0 ≤ n ≤ N .
Proof. We have
Gπn(V
n+1) = V n, KV n+1(π
n) = πn+1,
and
Gπ˜n(V˜
n+1) = V˜ n, KV˜ n+1(π˜
n) = π˜n+1.
Then
0 =
N−1∑
n=0
(V n+1 − V˜ n+1) · [(KV n+1(π
n)− πn+1)− (KV˜ n+1(π˜
n)− π˜n+1)]
+
N−1∑
n=0
(πn − π˜n) · [(Gπ˜n(V˜
n+1)− V˜ n)− (Gπn(V
n+1)− V n)].
Note that (V N − V˜ N ) · (π˜N − πN ) = 0 and (π0 − π˜0) · (V 0− V˜ 0) = 0. Thus rewriting the identity
above we have
0 =
N−1∑
n=0
πn · (Gπn(V˜
n+1)− Gπn(V
n+1)) +KV n+1(π
n) · (V n+1 − V˜ n+1) +
+
N−1∑
n=0
π˜n · (Gπ˜n(V
n+1)− Gπ˜n(V˜
n+1)) +KV˜ n+1(π˜
n) · (V˜ n+1 − V n+1) +
+
N−1∑
n=0
πn · (Gπ˜n(V˜
n+1)− Gπn(V˜
n+1)) + π˜n · (Gπn(V
n+1)− Gπ˜n(V
n+1)).
Now, using (16), we have, for each 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1,
πn · (Gπn(V˜
n+1)− Gπn(V
n+1)) +KV n+1(π
n) · (V n+1 − V˜ n+1) ≤ 0
and similarly for the terms of the second line. In the third line we have
πn · (Gπ˜n(V˜
n+1)− Gπn(V˜
n+1)) + π˜n · (Gπn(V
n+1)− Gπ˜n(V
n+1)) ≤ −γ‖πn − π˜n‖2.
Hence
N−1∑
n=0
γ‖πn − π˜n‖2 ≤ 0.
This implies πn = π˜n for all 0 ≤ n ≤ N .
To obtain V n = V˜ n for all 0 ≤ n ≤ N , we just have to use V N = V˜ N and apply iteratively
the operator Gπn(V
n+1) = V n and Gπ˜n(V˜
n+1) = V˜ n, from n = N − 1 to n = 0.
7 Convergence to equilibrium
In this last section we discuss the main contribution of this paper, namely the exponential conver-
gence to equilibrium for the initial-terminal value problem. Our setting is the following: consider
a initial-terminal value problem with initial data π−N and terminal data V N . We will now study
conditions under which π0 → π¯ and V 0 → V¯ where (π¯, V¯ ) are stationary solutions, as N → ∞.
In fact we will show this is true if assumptions 4, 7, 8, 10 and 11 hold.
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7.1 A-priori bounds
We start by establishing some useful a-priori bounds.
Lemma 2. Suppose assumption 4, 7, and 11 holds. Let {(πn, V n) ; −N ≤ n ≤ N} and
{(π˜n, V˜ n) ; −N ≤ n ≤ N} be two solutions of the mean field game. Then we have
‖V˜ −N − V −N‖ ≤ ‖V˜ N − V N‖+N2K. (23)
Proof. Applying proposition 4 we have that
GπN−1(V˜
N )i − GπN−1(V
N )i ≤
∑
j
PV
N ,πN−1
ij (V˜
N
j − V
N
j ).
Then
GπN−1(V˜
N )i − Gπ˜N−1(V˜
N )i + V˜
N−1
i − V
N−1
i ≤ ‖V˜
N − V N‖,
also we have
GπN−1(V˜
N )i − Gπ˜N−1(V˜
N )i
≤
∑
j
[cij(π
N−1, P V˜
N ,π˜N−1
i· )− cij(π˜
N−1, P V˜
N ,π˜N−1
i· )]P
V˜ N ,π˜N−1
ij ≤ K.
Hence,
V˜ N−1i − V
N−1
i ≤ ‖V˜
N − V N‖+K
Exchanging the roles of (πN−1, V N ) and (π˜N−1, V˜ N ) we get
V N−1i − V˜
N−1
i ≤ ‖V˜
N − V N‖+K,
thus
‖V˜ N−1 − V N−1‖ ≤ ‖V˜ N − V N‖+K
Reasoning by induction we obtain that
‖V˜ −N − V −N‖ ≤ ‖V˜ N − V N‖+N2K.
7.2 Exponential convergence
We recover the proof of theorem 6 to obtain an important estimate:
Proposition 13. Suppose assumptions 4, 7, 8 and 10 hold. Let {(πn, V n) ; −N ≤ n ≤ N} and
{(π˜n, V˜ n) ; −N ≤ n ≤ N} be solutions to the mean field game. Let C = 1/γ. Then
N−1∑
n=−N+1
‖πn − π˜n‖2 + ‖V n − V˜ n‖2#
≤ C
(
‖πN − π˜N‖2 + ‖V N − V˜ N‖2# + ‖π
−N − π˜−N‖2 + ‖V −N − V˜ −N‖2#
)
Proof. As before, observe that
0 =
N−1∑
n=−N
(V n+1 − V˜ n+1) · [(KV n+1(π
n)− πn+1)− (KV˜ n+1(π˜
n)− π˜n+1)]
+
N−1∑
n=−N
(πn − π˜n) · [(Gπ˜n(V˜
n+1)− V˜ n)− (Gπn(V
n+1)− V n)].
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Then rewriting the equation above we have
N−1∑
n=−N
(V n+1 − V˜ n+1) · (πn+1 − π˜n+1)− (V n − V˜ n) · (πn − π˜n)
=
N−1∑
n=−N
πn · (Gπn(V˜
n+1)− Gπn(V
n+1)) +KV n+1(π
n) · (V n+1 − V˜ n+1) +
+
N−1∑
n=N
π˜n · (Gπ˜n(V
n+1)− Gπ˜n(V˜
n+1)) +KV˜ n+1(π˜
n) · (V˜ n+1 − V n+1) +
+
N−1∑
n=−N
πn · (Gπ˜n(V˜
n+1)− Gπn(V˜
n+1)) + π˜n · (Gπn(V
n+1)− Gπ˜n(V
n+1)).
Now, for each −N ≤ n ≤ N − 1, we have that
πn · (Gπn(V˜
n+1)− Gπn(V
n+1)) +KV n+1(π
n) · (V n+1 − V˜ n+1) ≤ −γ‖V n+1 − V˜ n+1‖2#,
and similarly for the terms of the second line. In the third line we have
πn · (Gπ˜n(V˜
n+1)− Gπn(V˜
n+1)) + π˜n · (Gπn(V
n+1)− Gπ˜n(V
n+1)) ≤ −γ‖πn − π˜n‖2.
Consequently
N−1∑
n=−N
‖πn − π˜n‖2 + 2‖V n+1 − V˜ n+1‖2#
≤
1
γ
(
(πN − π˜N ) · (V˜ N − V N ) + (π−N − π˜−N ) · (V −N − V˜ −N )
)
.
Note that, if c is the constant vector then (πk − π˜k) · µ = 0, where k = N,−N . Also, there
exists µk such that ‖V˜
k − V k‖ = |V˜ k − V k + µk|. Hence
N−1∑
n=−N+1
‖πn − π˜n‖2 + ‖V n − V˜ n‖2#
≤ C
(
‖πN − π˜N‖2 + ‖V N − V˜ N‖2# + ‖π
−N − π˜−N‖2 + ‖V −N − V˜ −N‖2#
)
,
if we denote C = 1/γ.
Define f0 = ‖π
0 − π˜0‖2 + ‖V 0 − V˜ 0‖2#, and, for n > 0
fn = ‖π
n − π˜n‖2 + ‖V n − V˜ n‖2# + ‖π
−n − π˜−n‖2 + ‖V −n − V˜ −n‖2#.
The previous proposition implies
N−1∑
n=0
fn ≤ CfN . (24)
Note that the previous proposition and lemma 2 imply
fN ≤ ‖π
N − π˜N‖2 + ‖π−N − π˜−N‖2 + ‖V N − V˜ N‖2# + (‖V
N − V˜ N‖+N2K)2 . (25)
The next lemma is the only missing tool to get exponential decay:
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Lemma 3. Suppose fn ≥ 0 and that
N−1∑
n=0
fn ≤ CfN . (26)
Then
f0 ≤ C
(
C
C + 1
)N−1
fN .
Proof. The proof follows by induction. The case N = 1 is simply a particular case of (26):
f0 ≤ Cf1.
Now, observe that
CfN+1 ≥
N∑
n=0
fn ≥ f0 +
N∑
n=1
1
C
(
C + 1
C
)n−1
f0
= f0
[
1 +
1
C
(
C+1
C
)N
− 1
C+1
C
− 1
]
= f0
[
1 +
(
C + 1
C
)N
− 1
]
= f0
(
C + 1
C
)N
,
which ends the proof.
Theorem 7. Suppose assumptions 4, 7, 8, 10 and 11 hold. Fix V˜ , π˜. Given N > 0, denote by
(π0N , V
0
N ) the solution of the mean field game at time 0 that has initial distribution π
−N = π˜ and
terminal cost V N = V˜ .
Then, as N →∞
V 0N → V¯ ( in R
d/R), π0N → π¯
where V¯ and π¯ is the unique stationary solution.
Proof. By theorem 6, we can define, for each N , a map ΞN : S×R
d/R→ S×Rd/R, that associates
to each pair (π˜, V˜ ) the pair (π0N , V
0
N ). Here S×R
d/R is given the product topology where in Rd/R
we consider the norm ‖U‖# = infk∈R ‖U + k‖.
Now, lemma 3 and equation (25) show that, for any two pairs (V, π) and (V˜ , π˜), we have
ΞN (V, π)− ΞN (V˜ , π˜)→ (0, 0)
as N →∞. Thus,
ΞN (V, π)− (V¯ , π¯) = ΞN (V, π)− ΞN (V¯ , π¯)→ (0, 0)
as N →∞.
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